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Entry and repositioning

Entry and repositioning (2023 Merger Guideline 3.2): one of the strongest ways for D to rebut P’s prima facie case in the case of a horizontal merger

Entry considers whether a firm that is not part of the market at the start of the prima facie case will decide to enter given the conditions that would exist after it entered

Repositioning: change in products offered

Entry and repositioning can rebut the presumption that a merger will lessen competition

Entry must be timely, likely, and sufficient

  • Timeliness: must be fast and durable

Entry must counteract any loss in competition before it occurs: actual or threatened entry must deter anticompetitive effects

Entry must be durable: firm is not merely entering to take advantage of a temporary price increase

  • Likelihood: must be certain

Entry must be so likely that no substantial loss of competition occurs

Market participants: those who are in or would enter the market based on the pre-entry price

  • Firms already in the market
  • Firms that would enter in response to a SSNIP (“hit and run” entrants)

Entrants decide to enter based on post-entry conditions

  • Entrant must evaluate whether it is profitable for them to be in the market after they’ve entered and likely lowered the price relative to the pre-entry level
  • If entrant expects prices to fall as a result of entry, they are less likely to enter (and vice versa)
  • E.g.: Baker Hughes, firms from other countries didn’t enter, there must be some reason why – likely that price post-entry would be too low

“The Agencies also assess whether the merger may increase entry barriers.”

  • Sufficiency: aggregate scale of entrants must be large enough to replace one of the merging firms

Entry may not be sufficient to prevent a loss of competition

  • E.g.: entering firms might be a small fraction of the market

“Entry must at least replicate the scale, strength, and durability of one of the merging parties to be considered sufficient”

  • Distinctions between the prongs:

Timely and likely entry by a small number of small firms: likely not sufficient because it can’t replace the competition lost from the merger

Sufficient entry by a large firm that is (1) several years in the future (not timely) or (2) not certain (not likely) would be not credited as a rebuttal to P’s prima facie case.

Relevance of sunk costs to timing, likelihood, and sufficiency:

  • Sufficiency: if sunk costs are high, an entrant may not enter at scale
  • Likelihood/timing: if sunk costs are low, an firm may enter quickly with high certainty – may lead agencies to classify firm as a market participant rather than an entrant

Caselaw​

  • U.S. v. Waste Management

Holding: Merger allowed

  • Ease of entry implies that the merger will not be anticompetitive
  • Test:
    • Prima facie case from PNB can be rebutted only by demonstrating that the merger will not have anticompetitive effects
    • A substantial market share is insufficient to void a merger where that share is misleading as to future competitive effects (General Dynamics)
      • Prof. Note: this is different than usual, not just that the market definition was wrong
    • Case law/merger guidelines suggest entry may be considered in appraising whether a merger will lessen competition.
  • Application of test: entry in the product and geographic market is so easy that it will negate any anticompetitive effect of the merger (as a matter of law)
    • Bidding on contracts and sunk cost: before entering the market and incurring sunk costs, a firm would first secure a contract
    • History of entry: firms outside Fort Worth have entered the Fort Worth market, indicating entry is easy
    • Incumbent reputation is not a barrier to entry: there doesn’t appear to be evidence that reputation has stopped firms in the past, and even if there is, why would that be a bad thing? The market should deliver benefits to those good at trash collection
    • Existing contracts are not barriers to entry: if it’s true that no one can compete in the market because people are locked in contracts, then no one can raise prices, so there is no anticompetitive effect – not a concern.
  • Successfully rebuts P’s prima facie case

Facts: Merger of American Container Service (a subsidiary of WM) and Texas Industrial Disposal in Dallas. The market is defined as trash collection excluding single and multi-family residences and small apartment complexes in Dallas County (industrial waste disposal). Combined market share in Dallas area will be 48.8%.

Prof. Notes:

  • Some judges rely on a broad interpretation of entry to permit mergers
  • This is one of the strongest statements by the court outlining how D can make a rebuttal
  • Note that ease of entry doesn’t defeat the prima facie case in every instance, but it does on these facts as a matter of law
  • Critiques:
    • Court seems to underestimate how hard it is to enter the market: not like a mom and pop shop can start an industrial waste disposal service
    • Reputation might matter: if certain waste, like industrial chemicals, aren’t disposed of correctly the waste generator might be on the hook for tort liability
  • Best argument: antitrust resources are scarce, leave it to the market to address the issue.
  • U.S. v. Baker Hughes
  • Holding: evidence of entry and expansion
    • Combination of factors were sufficient to rebut P’s prima facie case:
      • Past entry by two firms in 1989: past entry is the best evidence that the market might not be competitive
      • Potential entry by Canadian and other foreign firms: evidence that anticompetitive conditions would be disciplined in a timely, likely, and sufficient manner
      • Failed entry by foreign firms: attempted entry credited as evidence of entry/expansion (but could have been credited the other way)
      • Growth (expansion of existing competitors): entry + the growth in the size of entrants are significant enough to rebut
  • Facts: HHUDR case
  • Prof. Note:
    • Sunk costs: low like in WM because firms wouldn’t enter without first getting a contract
      • Further lowered by the fact that entering companies aren’t starting from scratch, they have lower costs
    • Note that D argues that the Canadian and Finnish firms are participants (make the market look more competitive), P argues that they are entrants (make the market look less competitive)
      • General exam note: don’t think about what’s “correct,” think about what the D would argue and what the P would argue
    • Entry is one of the strongest cases that D can make in a merger case because it appeals directly to the anticompetitive effect of the merger
  • FTC v. Heinz: entry at scale into the baby food market is hard because it would require substantial advertising to overcome barriers from incumbents’ reputation and consumer perception of quality